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ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the economic issues associated with
the presence of substandard threaded fasteners in the
construction industry. It begins with an overview of the
engineering concepts and terminology which will be used
throughout the remainder of the report. A short discussion is
presented outlining the various mechanical forces which act
upon these fasteners in order to develop an appreciation for
the seriousness of the problem. Past and present problems
within the fastener industry and market are also covered. The
problem is then thoroughly analyzed through the use of mathe-
matical models. The concepts of zero-sum and non-zero sum two
player game theory are used to provide possible solutions to
the problem.
The optimum solution cannot be reached under the current
market structure. The most logical solution will require the
intervention of industry associations such as the Industrial
Fastener Institute. This issue is addressed in the recommen-





B. CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY-------------------------2
II. THE DILEMMA------------------------------------------- 14
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND----------------------------14
B. CURRENT CONCERNS--------------------------------- 20
III. THE ECONOMIC ISSUES----------------------------------22
A. MARKETING THEORY--------------------------------- 22
B. ECONOMIC STRATEGY---------------------------------24




LIST OF REFERENCES------------------------------------------ 50
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST---------------------------------- 52
I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW
Starting in the early 1980's the fastener industry, like
other major U.S. industries, began to face stiff competition
from overseas producers. Industry experts estimate that
approximately 60 percent of the fasteners sold today come from
these overseas sources. This compares to a 1969 estimate of
only 22 percent.
The problem with the expansion of the "overseas connec-
tion" is two-fold. First, as suppliers turn to the lower cost
foreign market--foreign bolts can be as much as 30 to 40
percent cheaper than domestic--stateside producers are forced
out of business. This reduces the number of U.S. producers
available should a national emergency arise.
Second, investigations conducted by members of the
fastener industry have uncovered millions of "mis-marked or
substandard" fasteners in use throughout the American economy.
This is by far the more significant of the two issues and is
the main focus of this paper. As one group of experts put it,
"The real significance of the issue is, however, the crisis in
confidence in reliability for users of mechanical fasteners."
[Ref. l:p. 1]
The remainder of this chapter, and the following chapter,
will be devoted to technical/engineering issues. Terms used
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throughout the remainder of the paper will be discussed
briefly. In addition, the technical aspects of the current
situation will be reviewed so that the reader has a clearer
understanding of the seriousness of the problem.
The third chaptsr will be devoted to covering the economic
impacts of the issues presented in the first two chapters.
This area will be looked at using several different theoreti-
cal approaches.
B. CONCEPTS and TERMINOLOGY
1. Definitions
a. Threaded Fasteners
In its purest sense, the term threaded fasteners
applies to bolts, screws, structural bolts, nuts, socket
screws, studs, threaded rods, and other threaded devices used
to fasten two or more components together. Its use in this
paper, however, will be limited to nuts and bolts. Bolts,
screws and studs are said to have external threads; while nuts
and tapped holes are said to have internal threads.
b. Screw Threads
Screw threads are identified under a standard
system called the Unified System, abbreviated UN. The Unified
System was adopted by the United States, Great Britain and
Canada. It replaced the existing American National thread
form being used by the United States and Canada and the
Whitworth form used by Great Britain. Since its inception,
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the Unified System has gained prominence and is currently
recognized as the standard throughout the world. The Unified
System requires all threaded fasteners to conform to standard
specifications with regards to diameter, thread height,
distances between corresponding points, etc. The Unified
System is further divided into dozens of different thread
forms. The ones most commonly used are UN, UNR, UNJ, M, and
MJ. Originally, the UN and UNR forms differed only by their
root (bottom portion of the thread) design. Over the years
as manufacturing processes have changed, the majority of
threads produced are of the UNR form. UNJ threads are used
in special aerospace applications and the M and MJ are metric
equivalents of the UN and UNJ forms respectively. [Ref. 2:pp.
13-18]
In addition to thread form, thread series have
also been established to distinguish between fasteners with
differing number of threads per inch. The two series in use
today are Unified coarse (UNC) and Unified fine (UNF). UNF
threads contain more threads per inch. [Ref. 2:pp. 19-21]
c. Standards and Specifications
Mechanical properties of fasteners generally
relate to their strength characteristics. The strength
requirements for each grade are well standardized and defined
by a number of technical organizations. Two such organiza-
tions will be referred to extensively throughout this paper.
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They are the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
d. Grading
Threaded fasteners are broken down into various
classes, or "Grades," based upon their mechanical and/or
performance properties. There are two major grading systems
in use today.
The SAE grading system, the most widely referenced
system in use throughout the world, designates ten different
strength levels or grades in one single integrated document.
Each grade is identified with a number from 1 through 8.2.
Increasing numbers indicate increasing tensile strengths (the
term "tensile strength" will be discussed in the following
section).
Of the ten separate grades, only six are widely
used. The other four, grades 4, 5.1, 7, and 8.1 apply to
specialty items of limited application. [Ref. 2:p. 67]
Unlike the single integrated system developed by
the SAE, the ASTM grading system references each grade to a
separate published specification and they are designated by
the document number of that specification. The ASTM standards
provide the same basic information as contained in the SAE
specifications, but contain more in-depth information for each
individual grade as well as a significant amount of "boiler
plate" or repetitive general information. There are definite
cross references between the two standards.
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No matter which specification is being used, both
systems require that bolts belonging to a particular grade are
identified with a Grade Identification Marking as well as a
manufacturers mark which are unique to that grade and that
manufacturer.
2. An EngineerinQ Perspective
Throughout the course of this report reference will be
made to certain technical/engineering attributes of threaded
fasteners. While it is not essential that the reader be
highly knowledgeable in this area, a familiarity with the
subject will promote a better understanding of the issues at
hand.
The basic function of all bolts is to act like
springs, create tension in assemblies and to hold things
together tightly. A bolt's ability to perform this function
under various load conditions is determined by its Tensile
Strength. The tensile strength of the different bolt grades
is determined by the material, or alloys, which went into
fabrication and the final treatment process performed. The
various treatment processes available are: cold working;
quenching; and tempering. Quenching involves heating of the
steel to a high temperature and then cooling it quickly by
immersion in water or oil. This results in a harder, stronger
steel. It also creates a buildup of internal stresses within
the material which cause it to become brittle. The tempering
process reheats the metal to a somewhat lower temperature
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followed by a slow cooling. Tempering is designed to relieve
the built-up internal stress created during quenching and
soften the material. The end result of the two processes is
a material that is stronger yet tougher due to the reduction
of internal stresses. [Ref. 3:pp. 431-432] It is important
to remember that any treatment process will alter the tensile
strength properties of a given material composition.
As a bolt-nut combination is tightened the bolt
develops an initial tensile load, or "preload" due to the
elongation of the bolt and compression of the joined material
(see Figure 1). This preload (P) is in equilibrium with the
forces exerted by the material being joined (F). As service







Figure 1. Bolted Joint, Externally Loaded
rRef. 4:p. 58]
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Initially, as loads are applied, the bolt will
elongate elastically. This means that once the load is
removed, the bolt will return to its original dimensions.
Elastic elongation, or "deformation" as it is more commonly
called, will continue until load is applied equal to the Yield
Strength of the material. At this point the bolt will no
longer "deform" elastically, but will enter the Plastic
Deformation region. Once a bolt enters the plastic
deformation region it will no longer return to its original
dimensions after the load is removed and the rate of
elongation increases. Elongation continues until the
materials tensile strength is reached. At this point failure
occurs and the bolt breaks. [Ref. 4:p. 56] Figure 2 shows
graphically the relationship between tension load and




z DA - SAE Grade 8; ASTM A354 BID;
Yield strength A490. F568 Class 10.9!9 B - SAE Grade 5. ASTM A449.
C A325, F568 Classes 118 and 9.8
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Figure 2. Typical Load-elongation Behavior of
Bolts in Tension [Ref. 4:p. 56]
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Therefore, the rated tensile strength is a measure of
the amount of loading, or elongation, a particular grade of
bolt is able to handle before it fails. In other words,
"tensile strength is the amount of resistance a material has
to being pulled apart." As the diameter of a bolt increases,
resulting in a corresponding increase in cross-sectional area,
its ultimate tensile strength increases. Tables I and II list
the mechanical requirements and chemical compositions for
carbon steel bolts using the SAE grading system. Under the
column titled "Tensile Strength, Minimum" values are given for
the various grades of bolts. The measurement units of "ksi"
stands for thousand pounds per square inch. These values can
be converted into a total load value by multiplying the number
given by 1000, then multiplying this result by the tensile
stress area corresponding to the diameter of the bolt in
question. Tensile stress area values can be found in "Thread
Stress Area" tables which have been developed for both UNC and
UNF thread series. This value corresponds to the cross-
sectional area of the bolt, which is calculated by using the
outer thread diameter.
Once engineers have determined the amount of pulling
force present in a particular application, they can use these
calculations to determine the number and size of bolts
necessary to accomplish the job. While a certain factor of
safety goes into any design calculation, if the engineer
specifies a design requiring six, Grade 8, bolts and the
8
contractor installs something less, a catastrophic failure
could result.
A close examination of Table I will show that SAE
specifications are limited to a maximum bolt diameter of one
and one-half inches. Also, the mechanical requirements for
all SAE grades are condensed into one chart. This is not the
case for ASTM specifications. Each ASTM grade of bolt is
covered by a separate ASTM document comprising three to five
pages of information. For comparison purposes, the ASTM
specifications for A325 bolts (commonly used in construction
applications) has been reproduced in Table III. Although not
shown in Table III, the ASTM specifications go into much more
detail than the SAE specifications. In addition to the data
shown, each ASTM specification document also addresses other
areas such as: ordering information; manufacturing processes;
heat treatment; and product analysis. The complete ASTM
specifications also covers a larger number of grade
classifications than the ten grades listed in the SAE
specifications. [Ref. 6]
Where a cross reference exists between the two
specifications, the information contained in each is
comparable (i.e., the minimum strength values match with no
contradiction). The ASTM specifications will not be
reproduced in their entirety in this report due to the vast
amount of information contained within them. For further
9





BOLTS, SCREWS, STUDS, STEMS, AND U-BOLTS
PROOF YIELD TENSILE
NOMINAL LOAD STRENGTH STRENGTH
DIAMETER STRESS ksi ksi
GRADE (inches) ksi minimum minimum
1 1/4 thru 1-1/2 33 36 60
2 1/4 thru 3/4 55 57 74
4 1/4 thru 1-1/2 N/A 100 115
5 1/4 thru 1 85 92 120
1 thru 1-1/2 74 81 105
5.1 No. 6 thru 3/8 85 N/A 120
5.2 1/4 thru 1 85 92 120
7 1/4 thru 1-1/2 105 115 133
8 1/4 thru 1- 120 130 150
1/2
8.1 1/4 thru 1-1/2 120 130 150






MATERIAL and C C Mn P S B
GRADE TREATMENT Min Max Min Max Max Min
1 Low or medium carbon N/A 0.55 N/A .048 .058 N/A
steel
2 Low or medium carbon N/A 0.28 N/A .048 .058 N/A
steel
4 Medium carbon cold N/A 0.55 N/A .048 .058 N/A
drawn steel
5 Medium carbon steel 0.28 0.55 N/A .048 .058 N/A
quenched & tempered
5.1 Low or medium carbon 0.15 0.30 N/A .048 .058 N/A
steel quenched &
tempered
7 Medium carbon alloy 0.28 0.55 N/A .040 .045 N/A
steel quenched &
tempered
8 Medium carbon alloy 0.28 0.55 N/A .040 .045 N/A
steel quenched &
tempered
8.1 Elevated temperature 0.28 0.55 N/A .048 .058 N/A
drawn steel, medium
carbon alloy




Note: C = Carbon; Mn = Manganese; P = Phosphorous;
S = Sulfur; and B = Boron.
Source: [Ref. 5:p. 126]
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TABLE III
TENSILE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIMENS AND
CHEMICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A325 BOLTS
PROOF YIELD TENSILE
NOMINAL LOAD STRENGTH, STRENGTH,
DIAMETER STRESS, ksi ksi
GRADE (inches) ksi minimum minimum
A325 1/2 thru 1 85 92 120
1-1/8 thru 1-1/2 74 81 105
COMPOSITION, %
MATERIAL and C C Mn P S B
GRADE TREATMENT Min Max Min Max Max Min
A325 Medium carbon 0.25 0.58 0.57 .048 .058
Type 1 steel quenched &
tempered
Type 2 Low carbon boron 0.13 0.41 0.67 .048 .058 .001
steel quenched &
tempered





Note: In addition to the above elements,
Type 3 bolts also contain the following
elements: Silicon, 0.13-0.37%; Copper, 0.22-
0.48%; Nickel, 0.22-0.48%; and Chromium,
0.42-0.68%.




The Industrial Fastener Institute (IFI) is an association
of leading North American fastener manufacturers which was
established to promote technical excellence ard engineering
within the fastener industry. Working closely with technical
societies and organizations, they help to develop fastener
standards and technical practices. IFI acts as an information
processing and clearing house rather than a governing body.
Through newsletters and advisory notices, IFI keeps its mem-
bers informed of current events and issues affecting their
industry, and represents its members on issues of vital indus-
try significance. IFI has no policing powers and is therefore
unable to rectify any improprieties taking place within the
industry, other than informing its members that particular
problems do exist. In addition, it has no impact on overseas
manufacturers.
In 1985, IFI learned that significant numbers of
substandard, mismarked and counterfeit fasteners had been
entering the market for the past several years. Substandard
refers to those fasteners that are manufactured in violation
of current SAE or ASTM specifications for tolerances, either
during the manufacturing process or as a finished product.
Mismarked and/or counterfeit fasteners are those fasteners
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which contain alloys or compositions corresponding to a
particular grade but are marked as being of a higher/stronger
grade. After conducting their own investigation into the
issue, IFI identified the following concerns:
a. The countries involved in manufacturing the faulty
fasteners are: Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Poland. [Ref.
7:p. 2]
b. The fastener grades most often affected are: SAE Grade
8 and SAE Grade 5. Grade 8 bolts are used extensively
in manufacturing of heavy equipment such as vehicles and
aircraft engines.
c. Testing of 300 product samples taken from various
geographical areas throughout the United States indicate
that the number of out-of-spec Grade 8 bolts in
existence could be as high as 70 percent or over one
billion bolts. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
d. With an estimated usage of nearly eight billion bolts
annually, approximately 20 percent are the Grade 8 type
(roughly 1.5 billion). [Ref. l:p. 3]
Once their preliminary investigations identified the
magnitude of the problem, IFI began to delve further. Follow-
on investigations focused on three major problem areas: (1)
nuts have been discovered with oversized threads which allows
them to mate easily with their companion bolts but results in
stripping of the threads under load conditions (example of
substandard products); (2) the performance-indicating head-
marks do not accurately reflect the material content of the
bolt; and (3) material substitutions have taken place during
processing that causes the material to react improperly during
heat treating or hot galvanizing.
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Of these three areas, the third one, material substitu-
tions, has been the focus of numerous tests and evaluations.
Specifically, investigators have discovered that a significant
number of bolts identified as the high strength, medium carbon
alloy steel bolts (SAE Grade 8) are in reality the lower
carbon boron steel Grade 8.2 bolts. While both have identical
tensile strengths, as Table I shows, 8.2 bolts are limited to
one inch in diameter. In addition, grade 8.2 bolts are
seriously affected by high temperatures.
At temperatures greater than 200 degrees [C] (392 degrees
[F]), the low carbon martensite composition of Grade 8.2 bolts
looses hardness in a very short period of time due to
coalescence of the particle structure (the deterioration
process is even faster at higher temperatures). Coalescence
is the process whereby the material structure changes from
many small particles to fewer, larger particles. Larger
particles allow any "cracks" resulting from applied loads to
propagate (i.e., grow) much faster than will occur with
smaller particles. As hardness decreases there is a
corresponding decrease in tensile and yield strengths. [Ref.
3:p. 216] Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the
rate at which hardness (and by association tensile strength)
is lost at various temperatures.
Temperatures of this magnitude are found in numerous
applications--boilers and automobile and aircraft engines for
example--as well as certain manufacturing processes. A
16
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Figure 3. Softening of Steel at Elevated Temperatures
[Ref. 3:p. 399]
standard weatherproofing process consists of dipping the bolts
into a molten galvanizing solution which subjects them to
temperatures in excess of 800 degrees [F]. If users
unknowingly install Grade 8.2 bolts (which have been falsely
labeled as Grade 8) in high service temperature applications,
or dip them in molten galvanizing solution to enhance
corrosion resistance, a significant problem will occur as the
bolts begin to loose their properties at the elevated
temperatures. Specifically, the bolt will begin to relax or
stretch and lose its ability to fasten the joint together.
Hot galvanizing of an 8.2 bolt, thought to be Grade 8, will
cause it to become brittle on the outside and soft on the
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inside. [Ref. 7:p. 4] This will cause it to stretch and
break under stress. Either of these changes could result in
failure of the entire assembly.
The force driving manufacturers to knowingly substitute
grade 8.2 bolts for grade 8 is cost (more specifically,
profit). Referring back to Table II, SAE specifications allow
the use of boron and manganese in the 8.2 bolts. Both
elements are cheaper to obtain than carbon. The end result is
a bolt that is cheaper to produce being sold at a premium
price which leads to increased profits. A similar condition
exists when A325 Type 2 bolts are substituted for A325 Type 1.
In both situations, the only way the end-user can distin-
guish between the two types is to have spectrochemical analy-
sis run on representative samples. This analysis provides a
detailed breakdown of the samples composition but is quite
costly when compared with the unit cost of the fasteners. An
alternative testing method that is being offered is Eddy
Current Comparator Testing. While less expensive than
spectrochemical testing, it provides only limited results. It
can only determine if the composition of a test sample is
different than a known standard. It does not identify what
the differences are. [Ref. 8:pp. 86-87]
Since 1985 much attention has been focused on the Grade 8
vs. 8.2 issue. Sample tests have been conducted on bolts
taken from all parts of the country and all types of industry.
In 1987, congressional hearings were conducted by the
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Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives. These
hearings identified four major factors that allow the problem
to continue: (1) distributors are relying solely on the
certificates of compliance provided by the manufacturer and do
not conduct their own incoming inspections; (2) end-users are
not conducting their own incoming inspections (they assume a
quality product is being provided by the distributor); (3)
when incoming inspections are performed, they are not always
accurately conducted; and (4) the procurement chain for
foreign supplied fasteners is so complex there is a definite
loss of traceability between the manufacturer and end-user
(See Figure 4). [Ref. 9:pp. 91-93] Ignoring economizing
concerns, the ideal system would be one where the manufacturer
supplies directly to the end-user thereby cutting out all
middle-men. This would give the user a direct link so that he
could ensure adequate quality control and documentation. It
would also provide for immediate compensation if substandard
fasteners are discovered. Unfortunately, this system would be
highly impractical. Manufacturers produce fasteners in lot
sizes ranging into the hundreds-of-thousands while end-users
purchase fasteners in lots ranging into the tens-of-thousands
in some cases, but even smaller in most cases.
19
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Figure 4. Examples of Fastener Procurement
Systems [Ref. 8:p. 90]
B. CURRENT CONCERNS
While extensive investigations have been conducted to
determine the magnitude of the problem, only cursory attention
has been given to the economic impact. Specific cases were
identified during the congressional hearings where the
discovery of substandard fasteners at construction sites
resulted in the replacement of tens-of-thousands of bolts and
nuts. In all cases there were costs associated with the
varying amounts of rework required to replace the defective
fasteners. Some contractors were able to return the faulty
fasteners for full refund while others had to accept the loss
20
associated with scraping the material. Irregardless, rework
costs were borne by the contractor.
Although some cases resulted in fines being levied to
unscrupulous suppliers, the majority of the incidents only
involved the replacement of the fasteners. The issue of
dollars lost to both the suppliers and end-users has not been
adequately addressed. The remainder of this report will focus
on the economic issues involved in the buyer-seller
relationship.
21
III. THE ECONOMIC ISSUES
A. MARKETING THEORY
In the previous chapter, Figure 4 identified three
different marketing scenarios. At the time, it was implied
that the optimal system, from the standpoint of minimizing the
risk of receiving counterfeit fasteners, was a direct
manufacturer to end-user marketing system. This would provide
an unencumbered link between the source and the end-user
whereby traceability could be easily maintained.
Traceability is one of the key elements in reducing the
occurrence of counterfeit fasteners. The ideal system, again
from the standpoint of eliminating counterfeit components,
would be one in which each nut and bolt is accompanied by
documentation showing its lineage. If the end-user is able
to track faulty components back to the source, it will provide
him with the ability to seek restitution quickly and easily.
It will also readily identify the manufacturers who engage in
unscrupulous practices so that use of these sources can be
curtailed. The current system where importers and
distributors act as intermediaries makes tracking extremely
costly and difficult. At each stage of the process any
potentially counterfeit components can be intermingled with
legitimate ones.
22
The direct manufacturer to end-user scenario is only a
desirable alternative from the standpoint of improving
traceability. In reality, from a marketing standpoint this
system would be uneconomical and unmanageable. In real world
applications, distributors, wholesalers and retailers play a
key role in the marketing system.
These marketing intermediaries are able to reduce the
aggregate cost of distribution by reducing the number of
transactions taking place. If each manufacturer sold directly
to each consumer the number of contact lines would grow
rapidly. Interjection of a distributor or wholesaler to act
as an agent between the various parties will substantially
reduce the number of contact lines. [Ref. 10:p. 6]
In addition to improving efficiency, the marketing
intermediaries also provide a sorting function. By doing so,
they help bridge the gap between the varieties and quantities
of items demanded by a consumer and those generated by
producers. Sorting activities provide a smooth conduit
whereby consumers can obtain small quantities of a wide
variety of goods from various manufacturers, each producing
large quantities of a limited variety of goods [Ref. 10:p. 6].
Both the ability to improve transaction efficiency and
provide the needed sorting capabilities ensure that marketing
intermediaries play an important role in increasing market
efficiency. Elimination of these intermediaries in order to
attack the potential economic losses associated with obtaining
23
counterfeit fasteners could be a serious economic mistake.
Consumers might only be trading one economic loss for another
but there is insufficient data to say undeniably which of the
two would pose the greater economic loss.
B. ECONOMIC STRATEGY
Having eliminated direct marketing as a potential cure for
the problem, we must now focus on the issues that cause the
supplier to provide counterfeit substitutes in an otherwise
competitive market (as used throughout the remainder of this
report, the term "supplier" will include both manufacturers
and intermediaries). The basic premise will be, "What drives
a supplier to disrupt the Pareto Efficiency of the market
place by introducing counterfeit fasteners?"
In a Pareto-Efficient economy, the buyer-seller relation-
ship is such that resource allocation (i.e., supply vs.
demand) is at an optimal level. This "Pareto-optimal" (or
"Pareto-efficient") allocation is the level at which: there
is no rearrangement of resources (no possible change in
production and consumption) such that someone can be made
better off without, at the same time, making someone else
worse off [Ref. 1l:p. 63]. Refering back to the section on
Current Concerns in the previous chapter, one can easily see
that the dilemma currently facing users of threaded fasteners
from this efficient level. While a few suppliers are able to
make themselves better off, by increasing their profit margin
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through the use off counterfeit fasteners, they are doing so
at the expense of the consumer (or end-user). The consumer
is forced to either accept the increased risks involved with
unknowingly using substandard fasteners, or incur increased
inventory costs by spending additional dollars on part
inspections and tests upon receipt of their merchandise.
At this point, one may ask, "Why doesn't the government
intercede to eliminate the problem?" Many economists would
classify the current situation as a "market failure caused by
negative externalities" (negative externality refers to the
situation where the actions of one individual or firm imposes
a cost on other firms but does not compensate the other firms
[Ref. ll:p. 75]). In this particular case, the negative
externality is the availability of counterfeit fasteners.
Currently, a few sellers are able to engage in an excessive
use of counterfeit fasteners because they are not being forced
to bear the full cost of such actions. The only potential
cost to them is lost business. It appears that there are
sufficient numbers of buyers available such that the loss of
one or two customers will not severely impact business.
Stiglitz [Ref. 11] implies that this is a textbook case for
government intervention. Two options that could be used are
government regulations and/or use of the system to impose
fines or penalties.
Although the pros and cons of government intervention will
not be addressed, it should be pointed out that some action
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is currently taking place at the various levels of government.
For example, at the activity level, the Defense Industrial
Supply Center (DISC) is making use of an existing government
program to help reduce the risk of receiving counterfeit
fasteners. The Government-Industry Data Exchange Program
(GIDEP) is a government data base which is accessible by
government agencies and industries involved in government
contracts. The data base acts as a feedback system whereby
firms or agencies can issue and receive reports covering a
multitude of issues, one of which is supplier related faulty
fastener problems. Although the GIDEP system does not
generate a Blacklist of problem suppliers, it does inform
those using the system of suppliers which have been known to
provide faulty components (in all fairness, the GIDEP system
does give any supplier identified the opportunity to respond
to any allegations). This system allows the government to
assess a penalty on the nonconforming supplier. In this case,
the penalty is wide publication connecting his company with
faulty fasteners. This will significantly increase the
economic losses to those firms caught cheating the system.
While GIDEP has reduced the risk and/or liability to those
firms using it, it is not the ultimate panacea. While
eliminating some of the risk, there are added costs involved.
Organizations such as DISC and private contractors have been
forced to tighten their requirements on any, and all,
fasteners they procure. The number of receiving inspections
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being performed has increased significantly. Should a
particular firm discover nonconforming pieces as a result of
one of these inspections, he may then file a report
identifying the problem with the specific lot from a given
supplier. The report may then force other firms to perform
additional testing on other lots which they may have received
from the same supplier. This snowball effect is not without
added cost.
In addition to the increased costs associated with added
receiving inspections, consumers, aware of the potential risks
involved, are forcing their suppliers to provide higher
quality control on the components they ship. Consumers are
also forcing the suppliers to provide testing/conformance
documentation with each lot purchased. As tighter controls
are placed upon the suppliers, the unit costs to the consumer
are raised to compensate the supplier for his time.
One gentleman contacted at DISC commented that the
solution to the problem should be to "put more quality into
the product vice monitoring the product upon receipt" [Ref.
12]. Unfortunately, the solution is not as easy as it may
appear. One of the ways in which some suppliers are allowing
nonconforming fasteners to enter the market place is by
providing forged documentation with the components. The
forged documentation would lead the consumer to think that all
of the required quality control had been done when, in
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reality, it had not. This is just another facet of the
problem. [Ref. 9:p. 104]
In addition to programs being developed and used at the
activity level, steps are being taken to combat the problem
by the legislative branch of the federal government. Over the
past several years, Congress has considered legislation to
help control the problem. The most recent bill to come up
before the legislature is H.R. 3000, the "Fastener Quality
Act." The bill is worded as follows:
To require that certain fasteners sold in commerce conform
to the specifications to which they are represented to be
manufactured, to provide for accreditation of laboratories
engaged in fastener testing, to require inspection, testing,
and certification, in accordance with standardized methods,
of fasteners used in critical applications to increase
fastener quality and reduce the danger of fastener failure,
and for other purposes. [Ref. 13]
The intent of this bill is to protect the end-user by
placing specific requirements on transactions involving
threaded fasteners. The following areas are covered under
this bill: (1) testing and certification; (2) accreditation
of testing laboratories; (3) guidelines pertaining to the
documentation that must accompany the sale of any large
quantity of fasteners; and (4) requirements for manufacturers'
markings on each fastener produced. In addition to providing
specific guidelines covering the transactions, H.R. 3000 also
provides for civil and criminal penalties to anyone found
violating any of the regulations. The government is
attempting to attack the problem from both fronts. First, by
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increased regulations which make it harder for suppliers to
cheat the system. Second, by severely penalizing those that
do chose to run the risk.
Although the intent of the Bill is sound and it appears to
cover all of the major areas of contention, policing the
players involved could become an expensive and time-consuming
proposition. However, as we shall see in the following
section, the risk associated with the imposition of penalties
to those suppliers found in violation of the Bill does provide
an added factor that must be considered.
C. GAME THEORY AND THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
Perhaps the best way to analyze the current dilemma is
through the use of a strategy concept known as Two-Person Game
Theory. Game theory is the process whereby a theoretical
mathematical model is developed to analyze human behavior and
decision-making as they apply to problems obtained from real
life situations. The "Game" itself is defined by a set of
rules, or options, that apply to the situation under review.
In all cases, decisions are required from two or more
"players" (the term is used to indicate the agents involved
in the particular situation) to arrive at the final outcome.
The outcome is in the form of a payoff determined by the
actions chosen. The payoff to each player is based not only
upon his selection but also by the choice of strategy the
other player has selected.
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The rules of the game can be either explicit or implicitly
applied. If the rules allow for communication between the
players, as well as for the possibility of binding contracts,
then it is called a cooperative game. If communication
between the players is not allowed or is not desired then it
is considered a noncooperative game. [Ref. 14:p. 15]
1. The Zero-Sum Game
The simplest form of two-person game theory is the
Zero-Sum Game. Under this scenario, the gain to one player
from selecting one of his previously identified strategies is
exactly offset by an equal loss to the other player, and vice
versa. In order to make the discussion more applicable to the
current situation, we will assume that a player's choice on a
given "move" will remain unknown to the other player. For
simplicity, each player will have only two options from which
he may pick. To assist in analyzing the problem we will be
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Note: First payoff in each box is to the row
chooser; the second to the column
chooser.
Figure 5. Zero-Sum Game Matrix [Ref. 15:p. 67]
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As the game matrix shows, player one has the option of
choosing one of two strategies, 'I' and 'II.' Likewise,
player two has a similar choice of strategies, 'A' and 'B.'
Under normal circumstances, neither player will be told which
strategy the other has selected, therefore it is a
noncooperative game. Focusing in on player two, in making his
selection he may apply one of three possible principles: (1)
choosing the strategy with the biggest payoff--'A'; (2)
choosing the strategy which contains the highest average
payoff (this assumes that either selection is equally
probable)--'A'; or (3) choosing the strategy which contains
the "best of the worst" (also known as minimax) --'B.' He must
make his choice in this manner because their exists no
dominating strategy for either player. A dominating strategy
occurs when there is a higher payoff for a given player no
matter what strategy is selected by the other player [Ref.
14:p. 16]. An example of such a game could be made by
changing box 3 of Figure 5 from 2,-2 to -3,2. This would make
player one's selection of strategy 'I' and player two's
selection of strategy 'A' the best choice for each no matter
which choice the other made. Under the current conditions
however, if player two hopes to secure any sort of an
advantage, he must fully analyze the implications of his
actions. [Ref. 15:p. 67]
Starting with a provisional selection of 'B,' player
two must then ask himself what player one would do if he knew
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of this decision. Obviously, player one would select strategy
'II' for it gives him the highest possible payoff of 'I.' The
problem continues with this "what he would do if he knew that
I know that he knows.... " type of approach. At this point,
one would tend to believe that there is no clear-cut conclu-
sion. Player two can overcome this problem through a new
tactic known as mixed strategy.
The fundamental purpose of mixed strategy is to keep
your opponent off guard by randomly selecting between the two
strategies. Assuming that the probabilities associated with
each choice are equal (i.e., 50-50) then in the long run
player two would choose strategy 'A' half of the time and
strategy 'B' the other half. A similar situation exists for
player one and strategies 'I' and 'II.' Because the selec-
tions are made independently, the law of probabilities
dictates that each of the four outcomes will occur 25 percent
of the time. This will result in an average long-term payoff
to player two of (.25(-2) + .25(4) + .25(2) + .25(-l)] = .75
units per play with an equivalent loss to player one. [Ref.
15:p. 71] Under the 50-50 selection option, this is the most
that can be won or lost by either player. Deviations from the
50-50 selection option will alter the outcome depending upon
the extent of the deviation. Therefore it is in each player's
best interest to determine the one selection strategy that
provides him with the best expected long range outcome.
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Through the use of his mathematical model, Rapoport
[Ref. 14] came up with the optimum mixture for each player.
Player two would guarantee himself an expected gain of 2/3
units by utilizing a 1/3, 2/3 mixture independent of the
options selected by player one. This means that he would
select strategy 'A' one out of every three times and strategy
'B' two out of every three times. One must keep in mind that
although the proportions are mandated by the model, they must
be carried out in a random pattern. Player one will also be
able to guarantee himself a minimal loss of 2/3 by using a
5/9, 4/9 mixture. There is nothing either player can do to
improve upon this outcome as long as both players are assumed
to be rational in their selections. It is important to note,
that these are long term outcomes from many iterations and can
not characterize the result of any single play of the game.
[Ref. 15:p. 74]
2. The Non-Zero Sum Game
In the zero-sum game previously discussed, the gain to
one player is exactly equal to the loss to the other player.
In reality, this is not always the case. Games of strategy
in which the losses are not equal and opposite to the gains
are known as Non-Zero Sum Games. In the zero-sum game the
interests of the two players are determined to coincide
completely, resulting in equity. However, in the non-zero sum
game the interests of the players partly coincide and partly
conflict. [Ref. 15:p. 95]
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Most transactions currently taking place in the U.S.
marketplace are based upon a self-enforcing agreement between
the two players. It is not necessary to develop the
noncooperative equilibrium condition for cases such as these.
As the name implies, self-enforcing agreements are
ones in which the parties involved must make the determination
as to whether or not a violation of the current cooperative
agreement has occurred. There is no reliance upon a "neutral
third party" to determine if a violation has taken place and
to assess damages that may be attributed to such a violation.
Violation of the agreement by one of the parties would
normally lead to termination of the agreement by the other.
In the case of the counterfeit fastener dilemma currently
under discussion, if the supplier were to violate the
agreement by providing the consumer with fasteners of a lesser
quality then originally requested, then the consumer would
cancel the existing contract and probably refuse to do any
future business with the supplier. By doing so, they are able
to eliminate any additional costs associated with third party
intervention (i.e., legal fees, court costs, etc.). However,
mere canceling of the contract may not be a sufficient enough
penalty to deter the supplier from pulling this same scam on
some other unsuspecting buyer in the future.
In order for self-enforcing agreements to work, each
party must determine whether or not he gains more from
continuing with the agreement or from violating it. As long
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as both parties feel there is more to be gained from adhering
to the agreement, the agreement will stay in force and the
market will be free to operate at its pareto-efficient level.
[Ref. 16:p. 187] In essence, because of the limited amount of
information available to the buyer, he must rely upon the
trustworthiness of the seller. On the other hand, the seller
will only be trustworthy if he feels that his honesty will pay
more in the long run.
In the case of counterfeit fasteners, if the seller
cheats and is not caught, he will gain by an amount equivalent
to the increased profits he receives from selling a lower
quality product at a higher quality price. If the seller
cheats and is caught, under current practices he will only
lose an amount equivalent to the future business of the buyer.
If the transaction currently in progress is the final
transaction between the two parties, there will be no future
loss to the seller. The loss to the buyer is more difficult
to determine since it contains certain intrinsic values
associated with risk and liability which are difficult to
measure.
a. Prizzi's Honor
Perhaps the best way to describe the situation is
to provide an example using a Non-Zero Sum Game Theory known
as Prizzi's Honor.
For simplicity we will asume that only two
alternatives are available to each party. We start our
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discussion by defining these two options (i.e., the rules of
the game). First, player number one, the buyer, can either
inspect or not inspect representative samples from each lot
he receives. If he chooses to inspect, he will incur
additional inventory costs associated with whatever inspection
process he selects. If he chooses to not inspect, there will
be no added inventory costs.
Second, player number two, the seller, can either
cheat, and provide nonconforming fasteners, or not cheat. In
either case he will claim that he has not cheated. If he
chooses to cheat, he has a potential gain associated with the
increased profits. If he chooses not to cheat, then he will
make the normal profit associated with the prices set in the
marketplace.
Figure 6 shows a payoff matrix for the buyer and
the seller. If the buyer doesn't inspect and the seller
doesn't cheat, then the return to each is their normal base
amount (identified as zero). The seller would be able to
successfully cheat the buyer if the buyer does not inspect.
In this case, the gain to the seller is defined as "d" which
is equal to the loss to the buyer (-d2). If, on the other
hand, the buyer chooses to inspect but the seller opts not to
cheat then the seller will still receive his base amount but









R Cheat d2, -d2 -d3, d3 - dl
Note: First payoff in each box is to the row
chooser; the second to the column chooser.
Figure 6. Prizzi's Honor Game Matrix [Ref. 16:p. 201]
The final square is the one of most interest. In
this case, the seller decides to cheat but is caught by the
inspecting buyer. We assume that a new cost has entered into
the picture, represented by "d,." This cost is a penalty, or
fine, placed upon the seller for his unscrupulous actions.
When caught, the seller must make restitution for the noncon-
forming fasteners as well as paying a penalty to the buyer.
The buyer than gains the amount of the penalty, less any costs
associated with the inspections (d3 - d,). [Ref. 16:p. 200]
Before continuing on with the discussion, we must
make a couple of basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that
(d3 - d,)> -d2. This means that the buyer gains more by
inspecting if the seller decides to cheat. Put another way,
it is assumed that (d2 + d3) > d,. These assumptions now allow
us to develop a mathematical model which will relate the
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probabilities associated with the seller cheating, and the
buyer inspecting, to the costs involved.'
Clearly, the safest strategy for the seller to
take would be Don't Cheat. No matter which option the buyer
chooses the seller will be equally as well off. He need not
waste any time or energy trying to guess which option the
buyer will take and base his decision on this "best guess."
On the other hand, the buyer's choice is not as clear-cut.
His selection depends heavily upon which strategy he feels the
seller may take. If he feels comfortable entering into an
agreement with the seller whereby he doesn't inspect and the
seller doesn't cheat he would be wise to do so. Agreements
of this type would surely become cooperative agreements. Each
player would need continued assurance of the trustworthiness
of the other. This could only be maintained through direct
lines of communication between the two.
The ability of the market structure to maintain
the cooperative agreement depends primarily upon the selfish
interests of the seller. Once he makes a conscious decision
to deviate from the cooperative agreement, the system breaks
down. When this happens, we lose the ability to accurately
predict which course of action each of the players will take.
'The complete mathematical analysis will not be developed here.
For a detailed discussion of the development of the probabilities
of inspection by the buyer and cheating by the seller, the reader
is directed to [Ref. 16:pp. 200-204].
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The alternative to such a cooperative agreement
would be one of noncooperative equilibrium. Unfortunately
there is no single option that satisfies this condition.
Neither player has a strategy that, if selected, will provide
him with the best payoff no matter which strategy his opponent
selects. Therefore, the only noncooperative equilibrium is a
mixed solution. Under equilibrium conditions the seller will
cheat with some positive probability and he will be successful
also with some positive probability.
Following through the model developed by Telser,
[Ref. 16] he arrives at the following two conclusions based
upon the assumption that the probabilities associated with the
selection of either strategy by each of the players are equal.
First, the expected return to the buyer boils down to an
equation equal to the cost of inspections times the
probability of inspecting and it will always be a negative
amount (since the payoff associated with inspecting is a
negative value). Second, the expected return to the seller
will be zero [Ref. 16:p. 203]. The different values
associated with each player results from the different payoffs
to each under the four options presented by the matrix.
Contrary to what some may think, the equilibrium
probability of inspecting is not affected by the cost of the
inspections (d,). Instead, it is determined by the ratio of
d/(d2 + d3). Refering back to one of our original assumptions,
it should be clear that this ratio will always be greater than
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one. On the other hand, the probability of cheating is
dependent upon the cost of inspections (as well as the amount
of the penalty) as determined by the following ratio,
d,/(d 2 + d3). Once again, based upon our previous assumptions,
this value will always be less than one.
The previous ratio provides us with the focal
points to be used if we wish to reduce the probability of
cheating. Of the three variables which make up the formula
for determing this probability d, and d3 are the only ones that
can be effectively altered. Therefore we must focus our
attention on either lowering the cost of inspection or raising
the penalty in order to adequately reduce the probability of
the seller cheating through the sale of counterfeit fasteners.
Baring the existence of collusion (which would
require third party enforcement) between the two parties, it
will be very difficult to determine which of the noncoopera-
tive solutions will be the equilibrium solution. There will
always be a positive probability of cheating by the seller and
discovery, through inspections, by the buyer. The best we can
hope for is to reduce the probability of cheating to an
acceptable level. The extreme case would be where the
inspections are performed at no cost to the buyer and sellers
caught cheating would be put to death. This would reduce the
probability of cheating to near zero. Since authorizing of
the death penalty in such cases is highly unlikely, in his
mathematical model, Telser [Ref. 16] shows that reducing the
40
cost of inspection is a more effective deterrent than raising
the amount of the penalty. [Ref. 16:p. 203]
After careful review of the various options
available to each party, the results are somewhat inconclusive
and the prospects for a self-enforcing cooperative agreement
are rather dim. Whether the seller chooses the cooperative
agreement or decides to operate under the mixed noncooperative
equilibrium scenario the end result is the same. His long-
term return would be zero. Unfortunately, the buyer is not
quite as fortunate. He would get zero under the cooperative
agreement or -d2 should the seller decide to violate the
agreement (the -d2 return results from the fact that the buyer
does not inspect under the cooperative agreement). On the
other hand, if the buyer operates under the noncooperative
equilibrium scenario he will receive -d, times the probability
of inspection. With these facts in mind, there is no chance
that a self-enforcing agreement will work. In order for the
cooperative agreement to succeed, each party must have a way
to ensure cooperation by the other. [Ref. 16:p. 204]
The best the buyer can hope for is to keep the
seller in line by inspecting some of the time. If he does
catch the seller cheating, by trying to pass off nonconforming
fasteners, he must have the ability to punish him through the
assessment of appropriate penalties.
The current fastener situation is made even more
complex when one considers the number of intermediaries or
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individual players involved. Referring once again to Figure
4, the marketing system currently in place for the foreign
supplied fasteners is the one shown at the top. There are
three separate buyer-seller transactions as the fasteners make
there way from manufacturer to end-user. At each transaction
point the Prizzi's Honor scenario previously discussed can be
acted out. As each player attempts to out-guess his opponent
and derive his most beneficial selection the number of
combinations increases exponentially. The options become a
little more manageable if one assumes that a certain amount
of collusion exists between some of the players. Based upon
recent reports and investigations, it appears that one can
assume, with a fairly high degree of certainty, that collusion
exists between the manufacturers and importers and it may
possibly exist between the importers and the distributor/
vendor.
b. Summary
The non-zero sum game has provided us the tool
with which to attack the counterfeit/nonconforming fastener
issue. We must develop a way in which the parties directly
involved in the fastener industry are able to monitor the
system for compliance and bring pressure to bear upon those
participants who attempt to improve their own position at the
expense of others. In the following chapter, recommendations
will be made on how this can be accomplished through the use




The issue of nonconforming, substandard, or counterfeit
threaded fasteners has gained increased attention over the
past ten years. This increased notoriety is primarily due to
the large number of nonconforming fasteners currently being
found within the marketplace. The percentage appears to be
steadily increasing with no turn-around in sight.
Overseas manufacturers apparently are the only ones
currently providing the nonconforming fasteners. Countries
such as Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Poland are the principal
sources. The parts are brought into the U.S. market by
importers acting as agents for various distributors and
vendors. Once they enter the marketplace they are extremely
difficult to detect. Unfortunately, they aren't of a
different color or glow in the dark. On the contrary, from
all outside appearances, they look just like any other nut or
bolt. The only way users are able to identify the nonconform-
ing components is by employing one of several test procedures
developed specifically for this purpose--none of which are
inexpensive to operate.
Because of the potential seriousness of the problem, it
has drawn a significant amount of attention from both
government and private agencies. Each of these has conducted
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its own independent investigations into the problem but they
have all arrived at the same basic conclusion. Unless we
eliminate the number of nonconforming fasteners currently
entering the market place we run the risk of seriously
impacting the integrity of ALL U.S. industries.
The focus of this report was what impact, if any, these
nonconforming fasteners have had on the construction industry.
Research has lead to the conclusion that construction has not
been severely hampered by the present situation. Persons
involved in the construction industry have indicated an
awareness of the problem, and are perhaps being a little more
cautious in their procurement practices, but the economic
losses have been minimal. In most cases the costs have been
so small that firms were able to easily absorb them into
overhead expenditures.
Previous studies done on the effects these fasteners have
had on manufacturing related firms have uncovered a more
significant problem. Nonconforming fasteners have managed to
infiltrate the supply systems of manufacturers of all types
of equipment. This includes everything from cars and aircraft
engines to the M-1 Tank. Inspections and audits conducted at
government supply centers have uncovered millions of dollars
worth of nonconforming parts and components. In some cases,
the occurrence of these parts has limited the ability of units
to perform their primary mission. [Ref. 18]
44
How then does one go about eliminating a problem that, if
left unchecked, could have serious and far reaching repercus-
sions? Discussions in the previous chapter indicated that
several proposals are being developed in an attempt to stem
the tide of counterfeit fasteners. The first one involved
modifications to the current marketing structure to eliminate
the middlemen and thereby make tracking and identification of
the components easier. Analysis of this proposal showed that
while it was not without merit, it would involve other
economic costs associated with lost efficiency and therefore
might not be a viable solution.
The second solution centered around various forms of
government intervention. One dealt with government agencies
acting as information data bases (GIDEP). Other government
agencies, as well as outside contractors involved in
government projects, are allowed free access to this
information. One element contained within this data base
provides a list of distributors and/or vendors which have been
caught supplying nonconforming fasteners. The system attempts
to force these suppliers out of business by making their
actions known to the buying public. Unfortunately, the
information contained in the GIDEP data base does not get
widespread distribution.
Congress has also attempted to solve the problem at the
highest levels of government through the passage of various
laws. Bills such as H.R. 336 the "Standardization of
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Measurement Act" and H.R. 777 the "Fastener Quality Assurance
Act" were two initial attempts by Congress to resolve the
counterfeit fastener issue. Both appeared to be lacking in
substance and clout. The bill currently under consideration,
H.R. 3000 the "Fastener Quality Act," is by far the most
comprehensive attack on the counterfeit fastener issue and
would probably go a long way towards solving the problem.
However, as previously stated, government intervention may not
be the optimum solution to the problem. Government
bureaucracies such as the one envisioned in this bill tend to
impose abnormally high costs on the general public.
The only way in which we can reach a comprehensive long-
term solution is to gain the cooperation of the parties most
directly involved with the problem. A system needs to be
developed whereby the agreements reached between buyer and
seller are easily enforceable and the costs associated with
breaking from the agreement are significant. Monitoring and
control needs to be simplistic and self-supporting.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Any long-term solution to the problem must involve those
firms and/or organizations directly involved in fastener
distribution within the United States. Dependence upon
agencies or governments outside of our own territorial
jurisdiction would be fruitless.
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Who then are these players? The two obvious ones are the
distributors and vendors of fasteners as well as the end-
users, or buyers, of the fasteners. Of a less obvious nature
are the agencies and organizations which associate themselves
with the fastener industry. Since 99 percent of the risk
associated with the use of these counterfeits falls upon the
end-user, it would not be in their best interest to knowingly
use the nonconforming products. Policing or monitoring of
their operations is therefore not necessary. We must focus
our attention on controlling the actions of the seller,
because he currently has the least to lose and the most to
gain. How then do we go about shifting the balance of power
in favor of the buyer?
The conclusions arrived at under the Prizzi's Honor
scenario discussed in Chapter III provide the key. Using the
available mathematical models we were able to show that the
only real deterrents to cheating are to reduce the cost of
inspection to the buyer or increase the penalty assessable to
the seller. Organizations such as the Industrial Fastener
Institute are in the best possible position to accomplish
both.
Up to now, the IFI has only acted as an information pool
to keep its constituents informed of on-going issues relevant
to the fastener industry. Suppose they began to take on a
more active role. They have all the resources necessary to
develop an "Association of Fastener Suppliers." This
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organization could establish a network of approved, or
"licensed," fastener suppliers. The association would be
responsible for frequent random sampling of its members output
to insure compliance with its rules and regulations. By
conducting product testing on a large scale basis at
suppliers, importers, or major U.S. finishers, they would
reduce the cost of individual inspections through economies of
scale. They would also be able to guarantee the reliability
or credibility of the testing laboratory thereby eliminating
the possibility of false testing documentation. The costs
associated with establishing and maintaining such an
organization could be collected through annual membership fees
from its members. Once established and fully functional,
buyers would then choose to conduct business with association
members. This would provide them with the highest assurance
possible that the components they are receiving conform to the
specifications as labeled.
Initially, one may argue that the only thing this
accomplishes is to shift the cost of inspections from the
buyer to the seller. This is not necessarily true. The
ultimate result would more than likely be a slight overall
increase in the cost of the fasteners to the buyer resulting
in a cooperative agreement at a higher base amount. The buyer
is able to receive the benefits of reduced inspection costs
associated with the pooling of resources and information.
Each buyer is no longer required to perform his own
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inspections of each and every supplier he deals with. The
supplier gains through reduced competition. The rational
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